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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. The Statement of the Problem.
The aim of this thesis is the exposition of Andrew Seth
Pringle-Pattison's conception of personality. The nature of
the problem will necessitate a survey of his criticisms of
other philosophical systems which have any bearing on the
problem of personality. Pringle-Pattison’s method in all his
writings was to build up his philosophical system, if he may
be said to have had a philosophical system, through con-
structive criticism.
B. The Method of Procedure.
The nature of the problem makes it necessary to devote
a part of the study to a survey of other views of personality.
The first chapter has to do with introductory material. In
the second chapter there is given a survey of the life and
thought of Pringle-Patt ison. This chapter serves as a proper
background for a better understanding of his own view of
personality.
Chapter three is primarily historical. Here an attempt
is made to bring together the main points treated by Pringle-
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Pattison with regard to the development of the idea of the
soul. Most of the material in this chapter is taken from
Pringle-Pattison’s latest hook, The Idea of Immortality .
This work, which embodies the 1922 Gifford lectures in the
University of Edinburgh, shows a slight change of viewpoint
from that expressed in Hegelianism and Personality regarding
the relation of the self to the Absolute .
^
However, it is
best suited for giving a historical background for the study
of any conception of personality. His first important work,
Hegelianism and Personality
,
is devoted almost exclusively
to a criticism of the Hegelian conception of personality.
Consequently there is little in this work which can be used
as historical background for the study.
Chapters four, five, and six are devoted more specifi-
cally to the various aspects of Pringle-Patt ison 1 s own con-
ception of personality.
C. Sources of Data.
The material incorporated in this thesis is taken from
all the available writings of Pringle -Patt ison which bear at
all on the problem of personality. For the most part, there
fore, the sources are primary. The main primary sources are
Pringle-Pattison’s Gifford lectures at the University of
^ For a fuller discussion see p. 80 f
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Edinburgh. The first group of lectures were given in 1912
and 1913 and were published in 1917 under the title of The
Idea of Sod in the Light of Recent Philosophy . The second
group of lectures were given in 1922 and published the same
year under the title of The Idea of Immortality . In some
cases, use is made of other sources. Ernest TTorthcroft Her-
rington has given a short but helpful discussion of Pringle-
Pattison’s view of personality in his book. The Problem of
Personality . Many valuable suggestions also were gotten from
Peter Anthony Bertocci’s book. The Empirical Argument for
2God in Late British Thought . Reviews of Pringle-Pattison's
books in several philosophical journals have been helpful in
showing the importance of the problem of personality in his
philosophy.
2 This book is based on a dissertation in Boston University.
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CHAPTER II
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE LIFE MU THOUGHT
OF PR ITTGLE-?ATT IS OH
Andre v/ Seth Pringle -Patt ison is important in any study
of nineteenth century thought, not because of any particular
system which he propounded, but rather because of his insis-
tence upon certain philosophical truths and his logical ex-
positions and criticisms of various philosophical systems.
He has wielded great influence upon recent thought and has
commended his views to many minds through his vindication of
basic principles of common-sense and sound reason.'
1
'
He was born in Edinburgh on Uecember 20, 1856. That was
the year in which Sir William Hamilton died. He had held the
Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh
which Pringle-Pattison was destined to hold fifty years later
Pringle -Patt ison was the eldest of seven children, of whom
one, James Seth, was also to achieve philosophical eminence,
occupying the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of
Edinburgh at about the same time that his elder brother,
2Andrew, occupied the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics.
1 Merrington, POP, 130.
2 H. F. Hallet
,
"Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, 1856-1931,"
Mind
,
42 (1933), 137-149.
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5Pringle-Patt ison' s childhood and years of preparation
for his ultimate life-work coincided with Alexander Campbell
Fraser’s occupancy of the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics
which had been left vacant by Hamilton. There was to be a
very close relationship between these two men. Pringle-Pat-
tison, passing from the Royal High School of Edinburgh, went
on to study under Campbell Fraser. He took first honours in
both philosophy and the classics at his graduation in the
spring of 1878. He became a Eibbert Travelling Fellow and
spent two years in Germany. Returning to Edinburgh in the
early eighties, he became an assistant to Fraser. The ideal-
istic influence of this former teacher was discernible in
Pringle-Patt ison 1 s own later philosophizing as a corrective
of a native tendency towards an extreme realistic interpreta-
tion of experience. This enabled him to retain a steady hold
upon an ultimate metaphysical idealism while rejecting both
3
subjective and epistemological idealism.*
After successively holding the Chair of Logic and Phil-
osophy at the University College of South '.Yales and Monmouth-
shire at Cardiff, and the Chair of Logic, Rhetoric, and
Metaphysics at St. Andrews, Pringle-Patt ison was appointed
the successor of Campbell Fraser at Edinburgh in 1891, ex-
actly thirty-five years after Fraser’s own election, and
3 Ibid., p. 138
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fifty-five years after that of Sir '.7illiam Hamilton. From
this time to his death, he maintained his Edinburgh citizen-
ship. He has been called an Edinburgh man by birth, by train-
ing, by residence the greater part of his life, and also by
temperament and native bias. He seemed to be the very in-
carnation of the spirit of Edinburgh. He was a man of broad
and deep culture, scholarly reserve, and intellectual piety,
similar in some ways to the sceptical attitude and distaste
for enthusiasm which was characteristic of that other great
Edinburgh philosopher whose monument adorns Galt on Hill. Al-
though he was shy and reticent, his comments on men and
scenes gave expression to his deep responsiveness to nature
in its formal grandeur and sublimity, his recognition of in-
tellectual integrity in persons, and his appreciation of for-
4
mal dignity of social manner and institution.
His home life was one which gave him deep and quiet con-
tentment. In 1884, he had returned to Berlin for his mar-
TT
riage with Eraulein Eva Stropp, to whom he had become deeply
attached during his student days in Germany. She became
completely devoted to him and the country of her adoption.
They became the parents of four sons and two daughters. One
son was killed in the battle of the Somme in 1916; Mrs.
Pringle -Patt ison died in 1929. Three sons and the two
4 Ibid., p. 138
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5daughters are still living.
Pringle -Pattison possessed a very striking figure. He
is said to have had the head of an Olympian and the physique
of a Viking. His mind was well-fitted to his physical dig-
nity. He possessed a characteristic balance of intellectual
probity and confidence, with unfaltering certainty as to
the philosophical significance of moral, religious, and aes-
thetic values, which was an element of great strength in
impelling him to reject philosophies that too easily reached
their intellectual goal by a convenient underestimation of
refractory elements and objects of experience. His mind was
broadly critical rather than laboriously scholastic, on the
one hand, or naively speculative, on the other. This does
not mean that his method was destructive rather than con-
structive; nor does it mean that it was eclectic rather than
original. He describes his method as being critical and con-
structive
among the earliest published works of Pringle-Pattison
are to be found the Hibbert Fellowship volume on The Devel -
opment from Kant to Hegel with Chapters on the Philosophy of
Religion
,
published in 1882 by the Hibbert Trustees, and
the first essay of the volume of Rssays in Philosophical
Criticism
,
published under joint editorship with R. B.
5 Ibid., p. 138.
6 Pringle-Pattison, IOC, vi-vii.
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Haldane in 1883. There are to be seen in these early works
some of the qualities for which he became notable in later
years: a peculiar lucidity, simplicity, and dignity of
philosophical style. His style has been described as being
as strong and as nimble as steel; free from weight of detail
and the labor of setting forth implications and presupposi-
tions. It was free also from technical jargon and those
quaint attempts at clearness by the neologisms and formulas
which have become characteristic of some modern schools of
thought. His early bent for literature never left him, and
he had a firm belief in the possibility of expressing the
greater part of philosophical ideas clearly, succinctly, and
pointedly by the use of ordinary literary English. Yet his
thought will sustain analysis and critical inquiry to a high
degree. The secret of his wider appeal was his ready assump
tion that his reader sufficiently interested and cultivated
to supply the minor detail out of his own knowledge. He
would not labor his points. In this way each reader could
supply what was required for his own unde rstanding
,
without
being distressed by the real or fancied need to grasp what
7
was beyond his capacity.
Pringle-Pattis oil’s first polemical excursion, which be-
came the basis of his wider and more general philosophical
7 Hallet
,
Art. in Mind, 42 (1933), 147
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fame, was the second course of "Balfour Philosophical Lec-
tures” on Hegelianism and Personality . These courses of
lectures were founded by Mr* A. S. Balfour to enable Pringle-
Pattison to produce original work in philosophical literature.
Three courses were given — in 1885, 1887, and in 1891. The
first of these was devoted to Scottish Philosophy . In this
series, he traced the development of thought from the implicit
subjectivism of the Cartesian starting point to the philo-
sophical scepticism of Hume. This gave him a basis for a
critical account of Thomas Reid’s doctrine of "natural judg-
ments,” and a comparison of this with the more thorough-going
and more famous anti-Humian arguments of Kant . In these
lectures, Pringle -Pattison firmly rejects epistemological
relativity and refuses to regard either Eume or Hamilton as
typical of the Scottish mind. On the basis that Scottish
philosophy is anti-phenomenal is tic
,
he prefers Hegelianism
8
to the phenomenalism of Rant.
However, in the second series of lectures, Hegelianism
and Personality
,
Pringle-Pattison made clear his thought of
the Hegelian system. Here he seized, on the one hand, upon
what is a matter of great moment of ethical religion, the
independent existence of finite selves, and, on the other
hand, upon what is a matter of vigorous belief among plain
8 Ibid., p. 140

10
men, the independent existence of the external world of
nature. The term TT independent " as applied to selves and
nature is to be understood in the context of Pringle -Patti-
son’s rejection of the Hegelian system in which both indivi-
dual selves and nature are identified with the Absolute.
Pringle -Patti son holds that although the self and nature are
parts of the absolute, they are formally distinct and inde-
pendent
The realistic consequences of the general argument were
elaborated in the third course of lectures delivered in 1891
and published in 1892 in the Philosophical Beview . These
lectures were published under the title Psychology, Episte -
mology and lie t aphysics . Here the matter was less finished
and conclusive, and perhaps for this reason was never pub-
lished in book form by the author. It should be noted, how-
ever, that Pringle -Patt is on never receded from the position
laid down in these writings. Much of his later writings are
attempts to clarify and expound these original doctrines of
his philosophy.*1" 0
Prom 1887 to 1907, Pringle-Pattison was occupied in
making clear the relation of his own philosophy with outstand
ing contemporary and historical theories, ranging from Pant
and Hegel, Lotze and Nietzsche, to Huxley, Balfour, Bradley,
9 I0G-, 267.
10 Hallet, Art. in Hind
,
42 (1933), 141

Fraser, Martineau, Spencer, Dewey, Kidd, and McTaggart. Much
of the writing was confined to periodicals. Some were
/
collected under the titles of Man’s Place in the Cosmos, Two
Lectures on Theism
,
and The Philosophical Radicals and Other
Essays .
This period saw also his dignity as a university pro-
fessor enhanced by the acquisition of an estate. Pringle-
Pattison’s name was originally Andrew Seth. In 1898, he in-
herited "The Haining," the estate of the Pringles at Selkirk,
from his friend, Mrs. Pringle-Pattison, a distant relative
of the Seths hy marriage. A change of his name, which was
a necessary part of the transaction, has given many foreign
writers ground for confusion and has caused some of his
earlier works to he attributed to his philosopher-brother,
James Seth.^
In the years 1912 and 1913, Pringle-Pattison was Gif-
ford lecturer in the University of Aberdeen. It was in
these lectures that he really gave a comprehensive view of
the philosophical situation in relation to the great problems
of God, nature, and man. In 1917, these lectures were pub-
lished in a volume entitled The Idea of God in the Light of
Pecent Philosophy . In 1922, the volume entitled The Idea of
Immortality was published. This volume embodied the 1922
11 Ibid T>. 143

Gifford lectures in the University of Edinburgh. These last
named volumes give Pringle-Patt ison 1 s mature and detailed
philosophical system. That the system makes no claim to
completeness takes nothing from its profound interest and
value. Its author was by nature sceptical of systems of
thought making claims to finality. This was true of him not
because he doubted the unitary character of the Real, but
rather because of his recognition of man's insufficiency in
the presence of ultimate problems. He did not doubt the
1 pintrinsic intelligibility of the world. ^
Pringle-Patt ison received many academic honours, al-
though he earned no degree beyond the Master of Arts. Honor
ary degrees were conferred on him by St. Andrews in 1898,
by Durham in 1902, and by Edinburgh, together with the title
Emeritus Professor of logic and Metaphysics, upon the resig-
nation of his Chair in 1919. He was elected a Eellow of
the British Academy in 1904.
He died on the first of September in 1931.
12 Ibid., p. 143.
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CHAPTER III
MIN POINTS TREATED BY PRINGLE-PATT IS ON ,'ITH REGARD
TO THE DEVELOPMENT OE THE IDEA OE THE SOUL
The problem which is being dealt with is the exposition
of Pringle-Pattison's conception of personality. As already
noted, Pringle-Patt ison did not develop any logical system
relative to the nature and meaning of personality, but sets
forth his own views indirectly through a historical analysis
and criticism of other conceptions. His views, therefore,
will be somewhat clarified if some attention is paid to the
traditional conceptions of personality. This is the aim of
the present chapter.
The traditional conception of the soul is of ancient
origin. It goes back to the period when primitive man began
to seek an explanation of certain aspects of his experience
which could not be accounted for from observation. Anthro-
pologists have shown that the phenomena of sleep and dreams
were important in this connection. In sleep, the body seems
lifeless and without sense or motion. On awaking, a human
being can recall dreams which he has had in the interval.
In the dream he has travelled great distances and met old
friends whom he has not seen for many years or who are per-
haps dead. As the body has remained motionless in the same
.-
#
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place, the primitive man came to the conclusion that these
expeditions were undertaken hy a second self or double 'which
could leave the body and return to it again. These early
ideas of the soul were vague and varied, but it was thought
to be some form of matter.^
The first real advance in the development of the concep-
tion of the soul was due to Plato, to whom we owe the idea
of its immateriality. Its primacy is emphasized throughout
his dialogues. He conceived the soul as being of heavenly
origin and immortal because of its kinship with the ideal,
although many of Plato’s arguments on the problem of the soul
are unsound, there are two which are of value because of
their relation to the later development of the idea. The
first is his argument for the unity of the soul and the second
p
is the doctrine of transmigration of the soul or rebirth.
Aristotle’s conception of the soul is different from
that of Plato’s. Instead of thinking of the soul as being
separable from the body, he conceived it to be a part of it.
It was thought to be the functioning of the body. Aristotle
distinguished the different levels of psychical function.
The basic function was that of assimilating nutriment and
regulating growth and decay of the organism. Then in a
1 Pringle-Patt ison, 101, 8. All references in this chapter,
unless otherwise indicated, are to works of Pringle-
Pattison.
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gradually ascending level came the sensitive soul as seen in
animals. The rational soul of man was held to he the highest
psychical function.
Although for the most part, Aristotle maintained that
there was essential co-relativity and inseparability of the
body and soul, he made exception for the reason. This he did
by distinguishing between the Active Reason and the Passive
Season. The Active Season was thought to be a separate and
active principle which made possible the function and actual-
ity of the soul. It was the I-Tous of intelligence which had
activity as its essential nature and was therefore "separable
and impassive and unmixed." In its highest and truest form,
activity was thought to be the characteristic of Sod. The
life of Sod was considered similar to the highest kind of
activity with us, but whereas it is possible with us only for
4
a short time, it is eternal with Sod.
Aristotle's arguments regarding the nature of the soul
had much influence upon the Scholastic philosophers in shaping
Christian Dogma. They took the argument further by asserting
that the soul was not so much an impersonal function of
thought as an individual substance made from nothing by the
creative act of Sod and introduced into the organism. The
medieval philosophers held that the soul is not derived, like
3 101
,
66 .
4 101
,
69 .
-.
_
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16 .
the body, from the parents. It was held to be "intrinsically
independent" from the body but "ext rins ic ally dependent."
This view was held because the soul was believed to enter
into relation with the body and certain of its activities
correlated with brain states, and in that sense dependent
on the instrumentality of the organism. What happens, ac-
cording to the Scholastics, is that the soul "unfolds its
native capacities, as the development of the brain and ner-
vous system furnishes opportunity. The body is simply a
5
medium of communication."
The conception of the soul as intrinsically independent
of the body and only brought into relation with it, takes
philosophical form in the assertion of the substantiality of
the soul. Substance, in this connection means "a concretely
existent, thing as distinguished from qualities or attributes
which are conceived. . . .as the attributes or activities of
some real being." The soul is defined as an immaterial or
spiritual substance in order to preclude the possibility
of thinking of mental phenomena as the activities or attri-
butes of the body. The argument advanced to substantiate
this view is that a subject of all our mental experience is
always assumed.^
The substantial view of the soul implies an "ultimate
5 101, 72
6 101, 72
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core of reality' 1 which does not change as does the more
superficial states or qualities. The soul-substance is some
thing absolutely self-identical in spite of the flux and
change of mental experience. ,T It is something to which
these experiences are attached or referred • . . something
which supports them, so to speak, in existence.” The Scho-
lastics and their successors, thus conceiving the soul-sub-
stance to be a changeless unit, went on to argue that it was
therefore indestructible and immortal. They maintained that
the soul was an atom ... an ultimate and indivisible
7
particle . . . and, therefore could not be destroyed.
Pringle-Patt ison thinks that the origin of the belief
in a substantial soul represents a survival of the primitive
animistic idea of a ghostly double which leaves the
body at death and enables us to think of the life
of the dead man as continued in some fashion after
the dissolution of the bodily frame.
He thinks that philosophers, as well as ordinary men, cling
tenaciously to the idea for this particular reason. This
is especially true of the Scholastic philosophers, Descartes
and the long line of thinkers, including the late Dr. Mc-
9
Dougall, the most recent champion of the doctrine.
John Locke approaches the problem differently in a
chapter on ” Identity and Diversity” which he added to the
7 101
,
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8 101
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74 .
9 101
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second edition of his Essay. He argued that identity did
not depend on any underlying soul-substance but on conscious
ness, ”the consciousness which accompanies every present
experience.” This consciousness, as Locke goes on to say,
can refer backwards to past action of thought. He says,
as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea
of any past action with the same consciousness it
has of any present action; so far it is the same
personal self. For it is by the consciousness it
has of its present thoughts and actions that it is
self to itself now, and can extend to actions past
or to come.-^
This substance, which was supposed necessary for identity,
is now shown to be superfluous.
While Locke showed the superfluity of any immaterial
substance, Lotze revised the idea with regard to a material
substance. He showed the emptiness of the popular notion
that there is at the center of everything we call real, a
kernel or grain of reality-stuff” which communicates ”to the
properties gathered about it the fixedness and consistency
of a thing. The term "real” is applied to anything which
behaves in a particular way but still remains identical with
itself to a certain extent. The reality of a thing is not
some kind of material unit, but
simply the law according to which the changeable
states of the thing are connected with one another--
the formula, so to speak, in which its life his-
10 Locke, EOU, Bk. IV, 3: Cf. Pringle -Pattison, 101, 75.
11 IOI, 77.
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tory or its modes of behavior are summarized.
The term ’’law" should not be taken in a general or abstract
sense but as pertaining to a particular thing. To clarify
this point, lotze makes a comparison between the essence of
a thing and a melody. In a melody there is a particular
law which determines the successive sounds in such a way as
to produce an aesthetic effect. Just as this is true of any
musical instrument, so it is that the "real thing is nothing
but the individual law of its behavior; the essence is not
12
a dead point behind its activity, but identical with it.”
In following this line of reasoning with regard to the
soul, lotze concludes that "the fact of the unity of con-
sciousness is e£ ipso at once the fact of the existence of
a substance.” He rejects the idea of some underlying unified
substance as being necessary for identity.
But after reaching this conclusion, lotze seems to re-
state the problem in its traditional form. He speaks in an-
other place that the unity of consciousness is ”our suffic-
ient ground for conceiving an indivisible soul.” Similarly,
in some of his other works there are statements in which he
13
unquestionably expresses a substantial view of the soul.
12 101, 77.
13 I 01, 79, 81. Pringle-Patt ison states that the reason
for such views is "that the real attraction of soul-sub-
stance for the imagination appears to be the satisfaction
it yields to the ingrained materialism of our ordinary
thinking.
"
,.
,
. f
'
-
-
•
r.':
.
,
'i
e
. t f
-
,
20
lotze cannot see how a physical event can give rise to a
feeling unless the ”sum of its motions” come into contact
with a subject which its own nature is capable of producing
feelings itself. Since one motion only produces another
motion and one physical event can only produce another event,
Lotze says that there must be TT a special ground of explana-
14tion for psychic life.”
Passing rapidly over the older materialistic conception
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Pringle-Patt ison
examines the theory of epiphenomenalism enunciated by Thomas
Huxley. In its practical consequences, there is little dif-
ference between Huxley's view and that of the materialism
which was discarded. Huxley agreed with the Occasionalists
in that they both held that it is impossible for the physical
to become mental or vice versa in spite of their obvious
correlation. Consequently, Huxley extended the Cartesian
doctrine of animal automatism so as to make it cover the
whole area of man's conscious life. There is consciousness,
Huxley admitted, but it has absolutely no effect upon the
organism. It is merely a ’'collateral product” of the work-
ings of the body. It has been compared as Pringle -Pattis on
points out "to a shadow which runs alongside the pedestrian
15
without in any way influencing his steps.”
14 101, 80.
15 101, 85.
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The doctrine of epiphenomenalism has given way, for
reasons which will be given later, to a more carefhlly stated
doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism. This doctrine
seeks to keep equilibrium between the mental and the physical.
The maxim of those advocating the parallelist ic theories is
that there is "no psychosis without neurosis." To clarify
the theory, Pringle-Patt ison gives the following illustration.
He says we can get a clearer view of the problem
if we use the letter A to symbolize a particular
neurosis and the Greek letter ^ to symbolize the
accompanying psychosis, A and ft are inseparable
elements of a single fact A r)
;
and if we symbol-
ize the next stage in the causal series as B v
,
we have no right to say that the result was due
to A alone, as epiphenomenalism says, or to 'T
,
as common sense might say, meaning by some con-
scious desire or volition. The volition may be
truly spoken of as a cause, but it cannot oper-
ate save in conjugation with the corresponding
neurosis. If we are to think and talk uorrectly,
we must say that it is the total fact A Q which
is the cause of the subsequent fact B.
This theory of parallelism, thus understood has been, and
16
still is widely held, according to Pringle-Pattison.
Pringle-Patt ison is critical of all these views. He
thinks that all these theories--the traditional or substan-
tial view, epiphenomenalism, and parallelism—are based upon
a false assumption. This assumption is that the final truth
about the material world is the account which physics gives
of it as a self-contained system of movements which are
1 ° 101
,
86
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mechanically determined. This "mechanistic dogma” leaves
no room for teleological or purposive activity in the world.
Such a theory completely ignores the fact of life. Descartes
is driven to deny that animals are alive while the Epiphenoirn-
alists deny that anyone is really alive.
Pringle-Pattison rejects these conclusions. Fo one can
deny the fundamental difference between a living being and
that which we call dead or inanimate matter. For example,
although the parts of an organism are outside of one another
spatially, there is a unity in it that cannot be duplicated
in any inorganic thing. An organism constitutes itself as
an active whole. It is a natural unity and an inorganic
thing is an "artificial" unity. The organism acts as a whole.
It is self-assertive, self-oreservative
,
and self-recupera-
5
tive. Its actions are selective in the interest of the whole.
Biology is based upon the assumption of a creature which is
able to reproduce and preserve itself in a changing environ-
ment. Pringle-Pattison goes on to say:
Terms like stimulus, response, behavior, all imply
the notion of selection, the power of adaptation to
environmental change, by which the organism main-^
tains and develops its own characteristic being .
^
7
Physics does not deal with any such organisms. It is con-
cerned only with a "continuous transmutat ion of energy."
’.Then the physicist seeks "to treat the living being simply
17 101, 89
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as a network of pathways through which the energy of external
nature takes its course,’
1
he has gotten completely out of
his field for ’’such a conception does not fit the facts even
1 Rin the case of the humblest organism.”
7/hen the difference between the living and non-living
became clear, an older generation of physiologists propounded
a theory of a ’’vital force present in the organism, directing
the mechanical agencies at work, and so accounting for the
19purposive character of the resultant movements.” However,
this theory was soon set aside by a later group of Physio-
logists for the simple reason that this unverifiable entity
paralyzed research. From a scientific standpoint, they could
deal only with known physical and chemical forces. As a
method, this mechanistic ideal was of great importance. Un-
fortunately, however, this rule of method soon hardened into
a dogma, ’’while the larger considerations which had promoted
20
the vital ist hypothesis were simply left on the side.”
During the latter part of the last century, vitalism
re-asserted itself. A body of trained physiologists and
active thinkers challenged the mechanistic explanation, con-
tending that vital processes, no matter how simple, could be
adequately stated in physical terms. Pringle -Patti son thinks
18 101, 89.
1 9 101, 90.
20 101, 90.
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that this neo-vitalism is inclined to err, as did the older
vitalism, in that it seemed to place the central control of
the nervous processes in a separate entity, which by some
kind of interference ab extra
,
modifies and directs a course
of events which is otherwise conceived as proceeding on purely
mechanical principles. The criticism here is that this idea
cancels all the good in the new conception of the organism.
Nothing happens inorganically in a living organism. Pringle-
Pattison maintains that the only way to evade the impasse
is to avoid trying to explain how an organism comes to be-
have as it does. Hather we should accept life as an ultimate
21fact which must be accepted.
"
./hen the fact of life and its nature is realized, the
"hopeless dualism between pure spirit on the one side add a
dead 'world of physical forces on the other" ceases to be a
problem. The living body is the concrete reality with which
we have to deal, and we come to a recognition that the
scheme of mass-points and forces to which the physicist re-
duces the world, so far from representing the ultimate reality
of things, is no more than an abstract construction for his
22
own immediate purposes.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ORIGIN OF THE SEIF
A. The Meaning of Creation.
-is stated in the previous chapter, the scholastics
maintained that the substantial soul was produced by the
creative act of God and introduced bodily into the organism.
It was seen to be "intrinsically independent ” of the body,
but "extrinsically dependent” in that it enters into relations
with the body, and certain of its activities are correlated
with brain states. In that sense, the soul was held to be
dependent on the instrumentality of the organism, although
it neither grows nor decays with the body.
1
Pringle-Patt ison does not entirely reject this explana-
tion but thinks that the necessary qualification for the
acceptance of it, makes it nugatory. He thinks that the
soul or Self gradually unfolds its native capacities as the
development of the brain and nervous system furnishes the
opportunity. The body is considered only an instrument and
.
2
a means oi communicat ion.
If the theory of the scholastics is accepted even
partially, the pressing question is raised as to how much
1 101, 69
2 101, 69

of the soul or self is actually created and incorporated into
the organic conditions. Pringle-Pattison maintains that no
soul is ready made in the sense suggested. It is thought to
he a transparent absurdity which makes the whole process of
experience superfluous. A self-conscious being can only make
3
itself. It is not to be compared to the manufacture of an
article, which remains throughout something separate from its
maker, and which is dismissed, when finished, to do the
4
specific work for which the designer fitted it. The special
creation of a rational soul to meet the given circumstances,
means for Pringle-Pat t ison, no more than that the human em-
bryo is born with the potentiality of reason, and that the
human body is the means appointed for its realization. The
coming into being of the rational soul or a self-conscious
spirit is, he thinks, justly regarded as the "main miracle"
of the universe and that it has the appearance of being the
goal of a divine purpose. He believes that the origination
and development of such spirits may appropriately be spoken
of as a creation; "for it is the emergence of something new,
something which cannot be explained or understood from the
conditions out of which it arises, if we think of these con-
5ditions as they appear in themselves."
3 101, 70.
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The origin of selves, says Pringle-Pattison, is perhaps
the only fact to which we can properly ascribe the term
creation, because they necessarily import into the universe
an element of relative independence and seoarateness which is
not involved in the notion of externality as such. The under-
standing of such a process of creation, Pringle-Pattison
thinks is necessarily beyond us. Sven where we seek to de-
scribe its phases, we become tangled in contradictions. At
times the self appears to be a product of the general system
of things; at other times it appears to be self-created by
its own action, to presuppose its own existence at every stage
of its progress. rT So we may say, he thinks, that there is
o
no first moment of self-consciousness, but only a second.
3. The Importance of the '-’act of Evolution
So far as the origin of the self is concerned, Pringle-
Pattison thinks that the process of creative evolution is
important. He points out that Aristotle believed the soul
to be the entelechy or fulfilment, the complete account of
the living body. But since Aristotle looked upon the body
as so much space-occupying matter and nothing else, his con-
ceotion would give the soul no relation at all to the living
experience which is its ultimate expression. Instead of
6 IOG, 286
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saying that the soul weaves itself a body, Pringle-Patt ison
7
would rather say that the body grows itself a soul. To state
the matter more concretely, he would say that the physical
organism in commerce with the environment is the medium in
which the soul comes into existence. And since the organism
is a natural body derived from parents, all the influences
summarized under the head of heredity are represented in its
Q
spiritual product, namely the soul or self.
In viewing the importance of the process of evolution
and its bearing on the understanding of the origin of the
self, Pringle-Patt ison follows out Aristotle’s conception of
the relation of soul and body consistently to the end, apply-
ing it to the rational soul no less than to the lower levels
of soul-life. He shows that the evolutionary process is the
fundamental and distinctive conception in Aristotle’s phil-
osophy in spite of the fact that at certain critical points
Aristotle unexpectedly drops the clue that has served him
so far. It is at these points, Pringle-Patt ison argues, that
the larger scope of modem science enables us to be truer
to Aristotle's principle than he was himself. He quotes
James Ward to the effect that
but for certain physiological errors into which he
fell, Aristotle would doubtless have found the con-
nexion between the organism and the soul as intel-
l 101, 70 .
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lectual, more direct, and more definite than he
supposed: through sensation, phantasy, memory,
we advanced to recollection, conception, intel-
lection.^
Pringle-Patt ison believes that the scientific history of the
globe and of the race shows that man attained the faculty of
conceptual reason by infinitely gradual steps.
^
In evolution, Pringle-Patt ison thinks that the ,T ret re-
spective” method of the explanation of the origin of the life
or consciousness is unsatisfactory. By "retrospective” method,
he means the method of explaining facts exclusively by
reference to their antecedents. Such a method may be unim-
peachable in a science like mechanics or molar physics, where
the facts which are dealt with are all of the same order--
transformations of matter and motion. This is possible be-
cause there is no gain in the process. Although there is
change, there is no advance, no new emergence, and everything
remains on the same level.'*''*" But where there is real evo-
lution, this method omits from its account of causation the
very feature which distinguishes this mode of change from
the dead-level equivalences of physics. The method of inter-
preting the more developed by the less developed is logically
tantamount, Pringle -Patt ison maintains, to a reduction of
the more to the less, and, therefore, is nothing more than a
9 IOI, 71.
IOI, 71.
11 103, 93.
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denial of the very fact to he explained. The fallacy in-
volved in this method can he seen when passing from one order
of facts to another, as for example, from inorganic nature
to the facts of life, or from animal sentience to the con-
ceptual reason and self-consciousness of man. It appears,
continues Pringle-Pattis on, that both life and self-conscious
ness emerge from antecedent conditions in which these dis-
tinctive qualities cannot he detected. But to insist on
treating them as no more than the inorganic or non-rat ional
phenomena which form their antecedents is not a legitimate
explanation, in the genuine scientific sense of reducing a
fact to simpler terms and thereby bringing it into line with
other facts. In this case, the simplification is brought
about by a process of abstraction which omits the character-
istic features of the concrete fact which is supposed to be
explained. Pringle-Patt ison thinks that this is a progres-
sive abstraction and not a causal explanation and that such
a process leads us "to imagine ourselves obliged to look on
the moving particles of physical science as the ultimate
reality out of which all other phenomena are woven by eun-
1 o
ning compensation."
Pringle-Patt ison contends that this fallacious method of
explanation has been held to by some outstanding scientists
IOG, 95.12
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because of their unwillingness to recognize in vital phenomena
a range of facts with distinctive characteristics of their
own and the resultant idea that such acknowledgement would
13
constitute a breach in the continuity of nature.
G. The Rise of Consciousness
Pringle-Patt ison maintains that both the origin of life
and of consciousness is to be explained by the transition
from one order of facts to another, or from one plane of ex-
perience to another. In the case of the origin of conscious-
ness, he means the passage from the merely animal life of
semi-passive perception and association to the distinctively
14human level of the active conceptual reason. In both in-
stances, the philosophical question is the difference of
nature between the two orders of fact, not the question of
historical emergence--how or when the one arose from the
other or came to be added to it. The fact is that there are
different planes or levels of existence, qualitatively dif-
ferent and, through that difference, opening up a new range
15
of possibilities to the creatures which they include.'1'
,/ith regard to the rise of consciousness, Pringle-Pat-
tison quotes John Locke to the effect that "the having of
IOG, 94.
14 IOG, 100.
15 IOG, 97.
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general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction be-
twixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties
of brutes do by no means attain to."-1-^ Pringle-Pattison de-
fends Locke’s position against the charges of the evolution-
ists who would maintain that this passage in Locke is a
piece of antiquated theological prejudice. The evolutionist
contends that there is no qualitative distinction between
human reason and the lower ranges of animal intelligence.
The whole thing, they would say, is a question of degree
—
of advance by insensible gradations, with nowhere any hint
of a difference of kind.
Pringle-Pattison states that an animal perceives ob-
jects, and is aware of the differences between the objects
it perceives: it distinguishes one object from another.
But the whole process is semi-passive; the differences im-
press themselves upon the mind as upon some sensitive plate.
Differences and resemblances between objects are sensed or
felt as part of the total unanalyzed perception of the ob-
jects. Pringle-Pattison goes on to say that the feeling of
the differences or resemblances is sufficient to determine
the animal's action this way or that; but it does not drive
an animal, as it does man, "to cast about," as Locke points
out, "and consider in what circumstances" the objects differ
16 IOG, 100.
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from or resemble one another. By this deliberative act of
comparison, man defines to himself the precise points of
agreement or difference. To state it differently, Pringle-
Pattison says that man isolates these points of agreement
or difference from the general context of the objects as
sensed or perceived— in short, man forms a concept, a general
or abstract idea. He maintains that Locke rightly saw the
differentia of human intelligence when he pointed out this
power of abstraction or conceptual reason by which he meant
the grasping of the mind of an idea which does not exist
17
as an object of sense at all.
Pringle-Pattison thinks that this idea of causal con-
nection lies at the basis of our scientific knowledge. He
takes exception to Hume who explains this idea as a habit of
expectation generated by the repeated sequence of two events
in the past. Pringle-Pattison goes on to say that what
Hume says is the length we may suppose the animal mind to
do--aut omatic association of two events through their re-
peated conjunction in the past. It is thus possible to guide
a whole life by the habits of expectation thus generated.
But the animal does not possess the idea of cause in the
strict sense at all—the general idea of connectedness or
the independence of one event upon another. To realize that
17 IOG, 101
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idea is to form the first conception of an independent world-
and independent system of definitely connected facts. The
birth of reason in the individual, continues Pringle -Pattison
is just the moment when repeated conjunctions suggest to the
mind this idea of connectedness, the interdependence, of the
two phenomena. Prequent repetition of events to the mind
that remains on the animal plane, produces a firm association
between two facts or firm habits of expectation. But if the
usual sequence should be interfered with, if expectation
should be unrealized, then the animal mind would have only
a feeling of discomfort. If such disappointments occur
frequently, the automatically generated habit of expectation
will as automatically tend to disappear. On the contrary,
the incipient human intelligence or the mind that has once
grasped the general idea of causal dependence, the non-occur-
rence of an expected effect sets the mind at once actively
to work, to find out the reason of the non-occurrence, to
find out what counteracting cause has been present to defeat
expectation in this particular case. Pringle-Pattison states
that it is obvious that such minds move on quite different
18
levels
.
18 100, 102
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D. The Continuity of Consciousness
Pringle -Patti son admits that there is a difficult ques-
tion as to where precisely association ends and reason begins--
as to whether there may not be instances of conscious pro-
cess in the lower animals which deserve the name reason in
the full sense. The animal mind and the human mind, he
points out, are to be taken as types, ideal stages of mental
development. He does not think it is necessary to minimize
in the least the continuity of the process by which one
seems to pass, almost at a touch, into the other. Continuity
of process and the emergence of real differences are T,the
twin aspects of cosmic history" and neither aspect should
obscure the other. Pringle-Patt ison points out that at one
time the magnitude of the differences led to static or typical
conceptions of separate species, but more recently the evo-
lutional study of intervening forms and the accumulation of
minute differences has made us realize "the extremely grad-
ual steps by which nature engineers her advances." He
argues that this continuity of process may be inconsistent
with "breaks," if a "break" is defined as a "chasm" or "an
alien influx into nature." He holds that if we take the
facts as they stand, without importing a theory into the
word, we may agree with Professor Wallace in his Prolegomena
19 IOG, 103
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to Hegel’s Logic that "all development is by breaks and yet
makes for continuity.” Pringle-Patt ison means that the
emergence of real differences in the course of the process,
or in other words the actual ,T increments' 1 or "lifts” in the
process is that quantity may be said to pass into quality,
difference of degree into difference of kind. Such crises,
he thinks, are "greater in their implications than in actual
moment"; they are points after which everything seems to
"move in a new dimension." He does not think that these
points can be assigned definite dates in historical sequence
since the very nature of time forbids the translation of
20philosophical analysis into literal history.
Pringle-Patt ison takes issue with those who argue that
consciousness can never be inexplicable from its natural
conditions. He thinks that such a position is tenable only
if these natural conditions are "substantiated as self-ex-
istent in their purely physical aspect." Each new fact, he
goes on to say, is unintelligible if we take our stand at
the stage below, and if, in the last resort, we treat "the
mechanics of the atom" as the ultimately self-existing fact,
out of which everything else is somehow to be conjectured
and so explained.^1
In his insistence upon holding to the continuity of
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nature in the evolutionary process, Pringle-Pattison states
that we must endow matter with T'the potency and promise TT of
all that crown the process. This does not mean that there
are characteristics, which although not exhibited by the atoms
and molecules of the physicist, that are potentially present
in these particles as such. Pringle-Patt ison thinks that to
insist in this way on regarding the later stages as existing
preformed, so to speak, in the bare beginning is to ignore
the true nature of the evolutionary process, as characterized
by the emergence of real differences and the attainment of
results which transcend the aoparent starting-point. He says
that it is only in so far as we connect the physical with
the vital and the conscious, as stages of a single process,
that we can speak, even with a show of intelligibility, of
the physical as containing the potentiality of all that is to
follow.
In connection with this aspect of Pringle-Patt ison 1 s
thought the word potentiality has a very definite meaning.
By it, he means the insight that, in the interpretation of
any process, it is the process as a whole that has to be
considered, if we wish to know the nature of the reality
revealed in it. To state it otherwise, it means that every
evolutionary process must be read in the light of its last
term. He states
All explanation of the higher by the lower is
philosophically a hysteron-proteron. The ante-
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cedents assigned are not the causes of the con-
sequents, for by antecedents the naturalistic
theories mean the antecedents in abstraction
from their consequents--the antecedents taken
as they appear in themselves, or as we might sup-
pose them to be if no such consequents had ever
issued from them. So conceived, however, the ante-
cedents (matter and energy, for example), have no
real existence--they are mere entia rat ionis
,
ab-
stract aspects of the one concrete fact which we
call the universe . All ultimate or philo-
sophical explanation must look to the end .
If we are in earnest with the doctrine that the
universe is one, we have to read back the nature
of the latest consequent into the remotest ante-
cedent. Only then is the one, in any true sense,
the cause of the other.
In conclusion, Pringle -Pattis on maintains that there is
no occasion to contest the conclusion suggested by the
scientific history of the globe and of the race, that man
became a self, or a being capable of conceptual reason, by
infinitely gradual steps. The qualitative difference be-
tween the mind of an animal and that of a man capable of con-
ceptual reason may be profound, and its consequences infinite;
yet, Pringle-Patt ison states that in the historical process
we seem to pass almost insensibly from one to the other, just
as, in traversing a mountain-pass
,
we may often be someway
down the farther slope before the welcome trickle of a stream
23
assumes us that we have already crossed the watershed.
I.IPC, 11-12
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CHAPTER V
THE UTTITY OE THE SELE
The self which comes into existence through the human
"body has unity. This unity is probably the most important
aspect of the self and is a problem which has caused a great
deal of misunderstanding. Pringle -Patti son states that if
we start with an adequate conception of the organism, we
shall be on the way to a better understanding of the kind of
unity which can really belong to the soul or self.'1'
A. Traditional Reasons for Belief in Unity of the Soul
Pringle -Pattison points out that many philosophers have
laid stress on the unity of the soul because the;/ felt it
essential to a belief in immortality. Many philosophers have
followed Plato in contrasting the unity and simplicity of
the soul with the multiplex and composite character of the
body. It is a very common thing, as Pringle-Patt is on shows,
for some of these thinkers to point out that the brain, ex-
tended as it is in space, and consisting of many parts, fur-
nishes no analogue to the unity of consciousness, and con-
sequently offers no foundation for it. Even if we suppose
1 101, 92
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the various items of our experience—the objective data fur-
nished hy the senses— to be correlated with the functioning
of different parts of the brain, Pringle-Patt ison points out
that we cannot suppose the unitary act in which they are
apprehended to be, as one v/r iter states it, "dist ributed over
an aggregate of separate atoms." "The unity of consciousness,"
Pringle-Patt ison quotes this same writer as saying, "is in-
compatible with a multiplicity of elements of whatever hind."
However, this argument concludes that to explain the unity
of an act or thought, we are forced to assume an ego or soul,
or in other words, an invisible immaterial being--as the
real subject of our experience. Pringle-Patt ison rejoins
that such a line of argument ignores the fact that, although
the parts of an organism, if regarded physically, are cer-
tainly external to one another, it is the very nature of an
organism, if regarded functionally or as an organism, to
transcend this mutual exclusiveness. The parts of an or-
ganism are so much members one of another and of the whole
which they constitute—they are so interpenetrative in their
action—that it is hardly a paradox to say that the organism
qua organism is not in space at all. Part and whole, con-
tinues Pringle -Patt ison, acquire here a meaning unknown to
physics, a meaning in which the necessary correlation of
2
the terms is for the first time apparent.
2 101, 95
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The organism, as Pringle-Patt ison states, is the first
real whole, the first natural unity. It exhibits a unity
far more impressive and. far more important than the punctual
unity of the hypothetical atom. It is pointed out that in
this unity and mutual implication of whole and parts we have
the best analogue of the kind of unity which we may expect
to find, still more intimately realized, in the self-conscious
being. Pringle-Patt ison thinks it unfortunate that philo-
sophers have too generally found their exemplar in the solid
singleness of the atom or the abstract identity of the
mathematical point. The false ideal in the doctrine of the
soul-substance has been shown to be closely allied to this
point of view. But Pringle -Patt ison goes on to state that
even in those quarters where soul-substance is disavowed or
at least held in the background, the idea of an unchanging
unit still persists. Ee points out that Lotze, Reid, and
McDougall hold to the idea that the unity is not the conscious
unity reached in experience, but an ,T element of peculiar
nature,” as McDougall calls it, existing somehow outside of
the process, a Subject whose experiences are set as a static
unity over against the flux of psychical content, and remain-
ing identical with itself through all the changes of that
c ontent
3 101, 95
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B. The Nature of the Unity of the Self
i
>
Pringle -Patti son goes on to state that similar expres-
sions in regard to the unity of consciousness occur in Kant
and Green, perhaps because they are difficult to avoid. But
in Kant and in Green Pringle -Pattison maintains that these
expressions are put forward in the course of a logical in-
quiry into the conditions of knowledge. The "I think,” the
unity of apperception which Kant "deduces” as the supreme
condition of the possibility of experience, is, as Pringle-
Pattison points out, expressly stated by him to be the
"logically simple subject"—which is "the form of every judg-
ment as such," or again "the possibility of the logical
qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thinking"—this
unity of the self which for Kant is indistinguishable from
the unity of the object, from "the necessary connexion which
we mean by nature"—has nothing to do, Pringle -Pattison quotes
Kant as insisting, with the substantiality or simplicity of
the individual thinking subject. To suppose that it has,
Pringle -Pattison goes on to show, is just the paralogism of
the old rational psychology—the argument from the unity of
the soul to it indestruetibility--which Kant conclusively
exposed, as Pringle-Patt ison states, Kant repeatedly tells
us that this "single self-consciousness," "this I or he or
it which thinks is in itself a perfectly empty and content-
less idea," "a transcendental Subject which we may represent

43 .
as X," no more than "the form of experience in general ."
4
Pringle-Pattison does not think it necessary to subscribe
to any of Ilant's specific doctrines to recognize the truth
on which he insists in such passages--that
,
when we isolate
the subject as a purely formal activity or function of thought,
and set it, so to speak, over against all its specific ex-
periences, it becomes completely empty or contentless. He
thinks that such is the abstract idea of function or activity
in general, and there is nothing in it to distinguish one
individual self from another. It is, he says, almost un-
meaning to talk of such a self as continuing to exist and
maintaining its self-identity through the succession of its
experiences, because it has no quality by which it is recog-
nizable apart from its experiences, no existence except in
those experiences . So conceived, it is not to be looked on
as a concrete reality at all. He agrees with Zant in calling
it a logical abstraction.
Pringle-Patt ison maintains that Hume's famous analysis
of the self contains far more truth than is commonly conceded
to it. He thinks that it has suffered from the paradoxical
form in which it is presented, and because it is put forward
in the context of a purely sceptical theory. Hut Hume's
criticism of a self which is distinct from all its states and
4 101, 95
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which remains the same through all their changes is, for
Pringle-Patt ison, unanswerable; and his well known descriotion
of the mind as ''nothing hut a bundle of collection of differ-
ent perceptions, which succeed each other with an incon-
ceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement " 0
is defective, Pringle-Patt ison contends, only because of the
psychological atomism on which Ms whole theory is based. By
psychological atomism, Pringle-Pattison means the twin prin-
ciples which Hume signalizes as the axiomatic presuppositions
of his thinking, "that all our distinct perceptions are direct
existences" and "that the mind never perceives any real con-
nection among existences." Pringle-Pattison, however, points
out that Hume proceeding on these assumptions, falls into
the opposite error to that which he attacks. Hume ends by
substantiating particular "perceptions" as independently
existing facts without any principle of organic connexion
between them: and the mind appears consequently as a casual
"collection" or "bundle" of associated items. This defect,
Pringle-Pattison holds to be fatal because, as he maintains,
mere succession is no more adequate as an account of the
mind than abstract identity. In spite of this error,
Pringle-Pattison holds that it need not blind us to the
truth of Eume^ statement, "they are the successive percep-
6 101, 96
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tions only that constitute the mind,” if we take that state-
ment simply as a negative criticism of the traditional doc-
7
trine of the simple identical self.
Pringle -Patti son also believes that the same relative
truth is expressed in a paradoxical and challenging form in
William James' dictum that T, the passing thought is the only
thinker.” He believes that James, in this statement, seeks
to give us the truth of Hume's contention, relieved of the
psychological atomism which invalidates it in Hume and in
the associationists who followed him. James sees clearly,
Pringle-Pattison states, that if we start with detached feel
ings, exnressly defined as "distinct existences” with no
"real connexion" observable between them— or as James ex-
presses it himself, "Simple feelings, non-cognitive
,
non-
transcendent of themselves, ideas, each separate, each ig-
norant of its mate"— it is pure mythology to imagine them
Q
"gumming themselves together on their own account." For
Pringle-Pattison, two similar ideas cannot yield an idea of
similarity, nor two successive ideas an idea of succession,
except to a knower who transcends and in some way includes
the separate items. "One cannot beg memory," James is
quoted as saying. That "later feelings are aware of those
that went before is no theory of the phenomena," James eon-
7 101, 97
8 101, 97
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9tends, "but a simple statement of them.'' "The present pass-
ing thought" is, therefore, Pringle-Pattison points out in
James' account, the "psychic integer" from which we start;
it is to he taken, Pringle-Pattison contends, not as a
self-contained unit knowing only itself, hut, as we really
find it in life, appropriately to itself all the thoughts
or states that went before. He continues hy saying that this
present thought or state, which James calls the judging
thought is the final heir and owner of all its predecessors.
It knows them and appropriates their content to itself. It
is, says Pringle-Patt ison in the words of James,
the hook from which the chain of past selves dan-
gle, planted firmly in the present . . . anon the
hook itself will drop into the past with all it
carries, and then he treated as an object and
appropriated hy a new Thought in the new present,
which will serve as a living hook in turn. 10
The appropriation of oast states of mind depends on the feel-
ing of warmth and intimacy which accompanies them. That
"annual warmth," James is quoted as saying, depending as it
doubtless does to a large extent on the vague mass of organic
feelings which is the continuous background of our more ex-
plicit consciousness, is the profound characteristic of any
present conscious experience; and it is some degree of the
same warmth which causes us to appropriate past experience
IOI, 97.
1U IOI, 98. (Quoted from James, POP, I, 340-1.)
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as ours. Pringle-Patt ison holds that if we add to this feel-
ing of continuity between such past experiences and the
present—a continuity realized, of course, not without gaps,
hut clearly enough marked through certain remembered stretches
of time, and most vividly, as is natural, in the way our most
recent experiences melt by slow degrees into the self of the
present moment—we have, in these two elements of resemblance
and continuity, the fundamental factors in our sense of per-
sonal identity.^'1’
Pringle-Patt ison accepts James 1 conception of the present
c onsciousness as inheritor of all its past, the "final re-
ceptacle" and at the same time the living points of further
growth—as itself, so long as it exists, the actual self. He
thinks that this is an infinitely truer way of representing
the march of our conscious life than the conventional idea
of an unchanging self or Hgo outside of the succession al-
together, as supposed, by its "relating activity,” to bring
connexion and unity into a series of otherwise unrelated and
disconnected items. The self, he insists, must be constituted
by its experiences and there is no other stuff of which it
can be woven. He says that Hume was right in saying that the
self does not possess the perfect simplicity and identity of
an atomic unit; it is rather a very complex structure. Hume T s
11 101, 98
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error, Pringle -Patt ison holds, lay in denying that there was
any real unity or connexion in the structure at all. Hum^s
description is an explicit denial of such attributes. In
such terms as "bundle” and ’’collection, ” Hume implies a mere
aggregate of separate items which just happen to be swept
1 2together into that particular heap or collection.
In the course of the section on "Personal Identity” Hume,
as Pringle -Patt ison points out, does use a phrase or two
which seem more adequate. ’or example, it is pointed out
that Hume says that: ’’The true idea of the human mind is
to consider it as a system of different perceptions or dif-
ferent existences, which are linked together by the relation
of cause and effect;” or again in the same context:
I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything
than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the
several members are united by the reciprocal ties
of government and subordination, and give rise to
other persons, who propagate the same republic in
the incessant changes of its parts. 13
Pringle -Patt ison thinks that the second metaphor is some-
what vague, but that the idea of system or of unity in mul-
tiplicity which characterizes a state or an organism supplies
just what was lacking in his original account of the soul.
Tor Pringle -Patt ison, soul means nothing more than the syste-
matic unity of the conscious experiences of a particular in-
dividual center- -the individual center being defined or
12 jQj gg #
13 Hume, Treatise, 3k. I, 4. Gf. Pringle -Patt ison, 101, 99.
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determined at the outset by the "bodily organism." 5-'
That the mind or self does exist as such a systera--a
system of memories and associations, of preferences and dis-
likes, desires and purposes--is, Pringle-Pattison maintains,
a fact of which we have each of us direct experience every
day of our lives. Introspection, continues Pringle-Pattison,
does not reveal to us at any given moment the whole system,
but it discloses the general structure and such particular
elements as are connected with the present interests which
prompt our review. He points out that we know, with other
promptings, that we might continue the process of explanation
indefinitely in other directions. We know the kind of thing
the self is, the nature of the existence which it enjoys, and
the kind of unity and continuity which it actually possesses.
This coherent unity of experience is the self, mind, or soul
in the only intelligible sense of these words, contends
Pringle -Patt ison, and no fact can be better attested than
the actuality of such selves, minds, or souls. Pringle-
Pattison asserts that it is important to bear the above fact
in mind; for if, as he has been arguing, it is wrong to think
of the self as a unitary something apart from and over against
its states or experiences, it is no less illegitimate to
think of the states as so many evanescent facts. This, as
14 101
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he shows, was the error in Hume's account and it is, he says,
a mistake into which we are constantly apt to fall when we
15
are thinking of the relation of body and mind.
Pringle-Pattison does not think that conscious states
should he conceived as existing independently in an objective
fashion. The statement of William James, "the hold fact is
just that when the Drain acts a thought occurs"—Pringle-
Pattison holds to he true as a reaction against the soul -sub-
stance
.
He believes, however, that it is open to criticism
as suggesting that the relation between the bodily and the
mental is to be understood simply as point-to-point corres-
pondence of a passing thought with a passing brain state.
So conceiving the matter, Pringle-Pattison argues that we
easily lapse into thinking of the brain as the enduring
reality, and the successive conscious states as sparks struck
by the working of the machine, a series of flashes which
break upon the eye and pass away. Pringle-Pattison repudi-
ates such a materialistic conception. He contends that no
psychology can dispense with the conception of a subject. We
must recognize, he says, that there is not merely mental
states or processes but a mind. The would-be -neutral term
"states of consciousness" is, he thinks, an unsuccessful
attempt to evade the acknowledgment that every conscious or
15 101
,
100

51
mental state is the state or experience of a conscious in-
dividual. He quotes James to the effect that ,T the universal
conscious fact is not 'feelings and thoughts exist', hut
'I think' and 'I feel 1 . ,t15
So understood, Pringle-Patt is on believes that the unity
of the subject is "germinally present in the simplest sensa-
tions.” In other words, what we have is not a feeling, but
a self feeling in a certain way. Therefore, he argues that
the self is definable at the outset only in terms of its
primitive sense-experiences
;
it is not, Pringle-Pattison goes
on to state that the complex self of later life, the self of
so many memories and interests and hopes—which is so much
more than any passing experience--owes its complexity, its
whole structure and character, to the consolidated experience
of which it is the organized unity. 7/e cannot describe, he
thinks, mental facts at all without assuming an individual
subject in this sense since they take from the beginning this
17
personal form. Therefore from the beginning, each exper-
ience is an element in a growing self- integrating whole.
Pringle -Patti son contends that the conditions which determine
the individual unity of such a whole— the closed nature of
the individual self, which prevents the experiences of Paul
from straying into Peter's mind, like cattle into a neighbor's
1 6 101, 101.
17 101
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compound- -are obviously of an organic nature. Thus every
soul that we know is an embodied soul: it is the bodily con-
ditions which, in the words of Tennyson "strike its being
into bounds.” The body is, in this sense, the medium through
which the soul comes into existence, so that Pringle -Pattison
acknowledges that the genesis of consciousness in connexion
with organic processes is something which it is ridiculous
to suppose we could ever understand, in the sense of ex-
plaining it from the organic conditions themselves. He
believes that the nature of conscious experience is simple
and ultimate; that it can be understood from within, but that
1
8
it cannot be mechanically put together.
Pringle-Patt is on takes issue with I.IcDougall, the latest
champion of the animistic soul. He believes that neither
the original emergence of a rudimentary feeling subject nor
the consolidation of subsequent experiences into the syste-
matic unity of the mature self is explained or made in any
way more easy of comprehension, except for the imagination,
by locating the successive thought or feelings in the empty-
focus of an immaterial substance or an unchanging ego. He
takes exception to IIcDougall 1 s stress on "the numerical dis-
tinctness of streams of consciousness” and "the individual
unity of the separate streams.” Pringle -Pattis on thinks
18 101, 102
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that McDougall is correct when he says that "the hanging to-
gether of a multiplicity of conscious processes in a numer-
ically distinct or individual stream is the very essence of
soul or spirit,” and constitutes TTa fundamental fact with
which every psychological theory and every metaphysical
system must deal.” Without this unity and coherence, as
Pringle-Pattison continues to follow the thought of IicDougall,
"there would he nothing that could he called spirit or mind,
hut rather a chaos of mind-stuff."^- 9
Pringle-Pattison states that the problem over which
McDougall puzzles himself is "’That holds consciousness to-
20
gether?” McDougall invokes the soul as the causal agent
to effect the desired result. But Pringle-Pattison thinks
that this is an instance of the fruitless and essentially
absurd desire to kno?7 "how being is made." Por him the unity
and coherence of the conscious experience is, as McDougall
says "the very essence of soul or spirit." It constitutes
the existence of a soul. To seek to explain that real fact
by saying that it is due to the presence and agency of a
soul is, argues Pringle-Pattison, simply to restate the
characteristic nature of the fact, and hypostatize it as a
causal orius of its own existence. He asks what explanation
can be given to a fact like the ultimate nature of conscious-
19 101
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ness. He wants to know if we are really to think of the
constituent items flying loose and of a soul or spirit as
some kind of apparatus which supervenes to grip and hold them
together. To these questions, Pringle -’at t is on thinks that
Paulsen's attitude is the most reasonable. Paulsen says,
that the processes of the inner life do not occur
in isolation, and that each is lived with the
consciousness of belonging to the unitary whole
of this undivided life. How this can happen I
do not pretend to say, any more than I can say
how consciousness itself is possible. ^1
Pringle-Patt ison thinks that it is necessary to dismiss
the idea of the substantial soul as some sort of supernatural
mechanism to hold the conscious experiences together. He
says that if we must indulge our imagination with the picture
of some bearer of conscious life, we should be satisfied
with the body, in which that life is certainly rooted in a
very real sense. For, continues Pringle-?att ison, although
we no longer identify ourselves with the body, it remains
for each of us, throughout life, the center from which we
speak and act and look out upon the universe. He points out
that not even the most abstract philosopher can escape from
this pictorial way of thinking. Common sense, Pringle-
Pattison says, does not feel that, in yielding to this
natural tendency, it is committing itself to any banal mater-
ialistic view of consciousness as not more than a function
LTcDougall, 3AM, 164
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or attribute of the body.
Fe says that the ordinary man feels instinctively that
such a view precisely inverts the true proportion between the
bodily facts and the conscious life. In this inner life the
ordinary man is aware of a coherent selfhood, constituted by
memories of all that he has done and suffered, of the friends
that he has known and loved, the causes for which he has
fought, as well as memo ri es --inte use st of all in their per-
sonal significance— of wrong done, of bitter remorse or re-
pentance unto life, and, together with all these memories,
his manifold present interests, his plans and purposes for
himself or for others, and the ultimate aspirations which
are the spirit of life. This conscious self, shaped by all
its experiences, and resuming them in an intense and char-
acteristic unity, gives to man, Pringle -Pattis on states, a
feeling of the possession of a reality to which the facts
of the animal life on which it is reared appear merely ac-
cessory. Ee says that man is ready to agree with Socrates
and 3lato that this is his 7T true self,” not the body which
he carries about with him. °
Pringle-Pattison concludes by saying that a man's self
is the coherent mind and character which is the result of
the discipline of time, not some substantial unit or identical
22 ioi, 104
23 ioi, 104
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subject present in his body all along. He holds that, where
such an evolution has been achieved, the self-conscious life
is the pre-eminent reality which the body in its structure
and organization exists to actualize. As a result of this
evolution, the center of gravity has been, Pringle -Pattis on
contends, completely shifted. The man, the concrete indivi-
dual self, can be adequately or properly described only in
terms of personality or character--by reference to his dis-
positions and affections, his interests and ideals. Beside
these, Pringle -Patt iso n asserts that the bodily facts, as
such, sink into insignificance, dear and familiar as they
are as elements in the whole. Instead of being an intermit-
tent and evanescent accompaniment of organic processes, the
spiritual self, created through the bodily medium, is seen
to achieve a unity and identity more complete and more per-
manent than can belong to any non-self-conscious being. ^
To summarize Pringle-Pattison* s ideas on the problem
of personality, the two following facts may be noted. In
the first place, the origin or creation of finite selves is
the main work of the universe. However, the process by which
selves come into existence cannot be understood. Creation
consequently means the coming into the world of a being which
exists in any degree for itself as a conscious subject with
24 101, 105
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a measure of "apartness" and independent action.
In the second place, the unity of the self is not the
unity of the ego or soul which is supposed to he the subject
of our experience. The self is the unity of consciousness.
Such unity is realized in multiplicity or complexity by the
self-conscious individual. All experiences--remembering,
willing, feeling—are realized as the experiences of a self-
conscious individual. The self is the coherent unity of
experience *
Pringle-Pattison has empirical evidence for his explana-
tion of the unity of the self. However, not as much can be
said regarding his explanation of the origin of the self,
-t times he seems to believe that the self is brought into
25
existence through the medium of the human organism; at other
times he seems to state that they are bits of experience
broken off the absolute. He speaks of this process as in-
26
dividuation. As he himself admits, he is dealing here with
an aspect of the self which cannot be understood.
3;j IOI, 70, et nassim.
35 I0k,i 285, 295, 297.
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CHAPTER VI
THE RELATION OF TEE SELF TO THE ABSOLUTE
A. The Universe and the Individual
The self does not exist absolutely independently of
other aspects of reality. Pringle-Pattison thinks that it
can exist only in vital relation to an objective system of
reason and an objective world of ethical observance from
which it receives its content, and of which it is, as it
were, the focus and depositary. ai.part from question of or-
igin, he thinks that it is only by a convenient abstraction
that we can discuss the nature and conduct of the individual
apart from the social whole in which he is, as it were, im-
bedded, and of which he appears to be the product. As the
individual is organic to society, so in still larger phil-
osophical reference the individual is organic to a universal
life or world, of which he is similarly a focus, an organ of
expression. Pringle-Pattison goes on to state that the
individual cannot possibly be regarded as self-contained in
relation to that life, for such self-containedness would mean
sheer emptiness. He thinks that it is absurd to talk of the
individual as self-subsistent or existing in his own right.
Rather the individual exists as an organ of the universe or
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of the Absolute, the one Being, the source of the rational
and spiritual content.'5'
Pringle-Pat tison agrees with Professor Bosanquet when
the latter states that TT the finite self, like everything in
the universe, is now and here beyond escape an element in
2the Absolute.'’ In other words, the individual self does not
exist ’’strong in solid singleness,” like a Lucretian atom.
The current of the divine life course through it; it is open
to all the influences of the universe. Pringle -Pattis on
cannot see how we can explain the fact of progress, if not
by this indwelling in a larger life—this continuity with
what is more and greater than ourselves. It is, he thinks,
from the fact that the finite individual is thus rooted in a
wider life, to whose influences it remains throughout ac-
cessible. Pringle -Pattis on believes this fact to be of re-
ligious significance. He holds that those visitings of grace,
of which the religious consciousness testifies, become most
easily intelligible—as well as those more violent upheavals
of the personality, in which, as religion says, the man is
born again and becomes a new creature. Therefore, so long as
it exists every self remains in principle thus accessible,
the possibility of such regeneration remains open to the most
3
abandoned or degraded.
1 IOG, 259.
^ Bosanquet, VAD, 257; also Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 259.
3 log, 259.
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Pringle -Patti son maintains that to realize the presence
of the universal in the individual for the life of the indi-
vidual in the universal, according as we choose to express the
organic or inherent relation which unites them), it is not
necessary to go to the absolutist ic point of view. The value
of a self lies in its content and this depends on the extent
to which it appropriates a common heritage of ideas and in-
terests. The life of the finite individual, as it builds up
its true self, is thus a continual process of self-transcen-
dence; its true personality or individuality, Pringle -Pat-
tison states, does not lie in unshareable feelings, but in
the richness and variety of its thoughts and interests. It
is not an abstract point of particularity; it is, or rather,
it makes itself, a little world, a microcosm. But Pringle-
Pattison holds that the contents of the self are essentially
shareable. In social interests and purposes the individual
becomes one with his fellows; and in science and philosophy,
religion and art, he shares those universal interests which
are the common heritage of humanity—which, in the most literal
4
sense according to Pringle-Pattison, makes us men. It is
obvious, he continues, that there must be an identity of
content in all selves, and that the extent of this identity
may vary indefinitely as between different selves. Pringle-
4
I0G-, 263
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Pattison thinks that although this identity of content may
"overlap" indefinitely in finite centers, they cannot overlap
at all in existence for their very raison d' etre is to he
distinct and, in that sense, separate and exclusive focali-
zations of a common universe . 0
Pringle-Patt ison does not disagree with the absolutist,
such as Bosanquet
,
at every point. He thinks that great
supra-individual creations impress us all with a sense of
permanent, or at least, of age-long reality. The structure
of a national civilization and the traditions which con-
stitute a nation’s life seem real in a sense which transcends
and overshadows the reality of any individual citizen of
today, or any of the nameless generations of the past, of
whose lives it is, as it were the abiding product. Pringle-
Patt ison believes that the time has gone by when it was pos-
sible to speak of such things as mere abstractions: it is
the individual who is apt to appear an abstraction when set
over against them. But Pringle-Patt ison warns that if we
are not to forget the fundamental structure of the world,
the counter-stroke must also be delivered. He states that
the universal is no less an abstraction, if it is taken as
real, or as possessing substantive existence, independently
of the individuals whose living tissue it is. They realize
5 IOG, 264
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themselves through it; it realizes itself through them.
Thus, continues Pringle -Pattison, a social whole, which is
the sustaining life of its individual members, melts into
thin air if we try to treat it as an entity apart from them.
Exclusive emphasis on the one side or the other is the ex-
planations of the perennial duel between individualistic and
organic theories of society or between nominalism and realism,
7
pluralism and monism, in the wider field of philosophy.
In trying to reconcile the idea of the distinctness of
individual selves with the idea of the relation of the finite
self with the divine, Pringle -Pattis on gets into some dif-
ficulties. In Hegelianism and Personality
,
he makes an at-
tempt to expose the ,T radical error both of Hegelianism and
of the allied English doctrine, rT which consisted in the
O
"identification of the human and divine self-consciousness."
He goes so far in denying "one universal self in all so-called
thinkers" as to say "--that each Self as Self is a unique
existence, which is perfectly impervious, if I may so speak,
to other selves—impervious in a fashion of which the im-
9penetrability of matter is a faint analogue.” However, his
stress on the fact that the self "resists invasion" and
"refuses to admit another, self within itself," on its being
6 IOG, 265.
1 IOG, 266.
8 HP, 226.
9 HP, 216.
f
'
’
,
-
«
„
-
_
-
c
-
-
—
-
f
6,3.
"the very apex of separation and differentiation," and "in
existence or metaphysically a principle of isolation," was
misinterpreted. 3ecause of this misinterpretation, Pringle-
Pattison regretted the use of the word "impervious." He
therefore grants in the Idea of G-od that: "the exclusiveness
of the self, especially in its relation to the divine was - -
too strongly emphasized in my argument." 10
Pringle -Patt ison points out that although the self is
a part of the absolute, they are yet formally distinct. In
speaking of individual form, he says that form is not like
an empty case into which a certain content may he put: it
is rather the structure and organization of the content it-
self. Individuals are formally distinct, he thinks not be-
cause ajnore or less identical content has been thrust into
so many empty cases which have afterwards had a numerical
label, or a proper name, attached to them for convenience
or reference. Individuals of a species are not comparable to
articles turned out by a machine, each of which appears to
be an exact repetition of its predecessors. Pringle -Patti son
states that "they are formally distinct, because they are
really different." He accepts the principle of the identity
of indiscernibles as necessarily true of all real existences;
that things are distinguished by their natures; and that
10 IOG, footnote 3, page 389
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they are different wholes of content. He maintains that if
we even make space and time the principiun individuationis and
try to reduce the formal distinctness of individuals to dif-
ference of position in the spatio-temporal series, such dif-
ference of position means a changed relation to the rest of
the universe, an exposure to different influences and a con-
sequent difference in the resulting nature. Thus he thinks
that space and time may be regarded ultimately as only a
mode of expressing the general fact of individuation--the
fact that there are finite centers at all.^ It follows,
contends Pringle-Patt ison, that every individual is a unique
nature, a little world of content which, as to its ingredients,
the tempering of the elements and the systematic structure of
the whole, constitutes an expression or localization of the
universe which is nowhere exactly repeated. He thinks that
appearances to the contrary are due to superficial observa-
12
tion and want of interest in the object observed.
Certain aspects of Pringle-Pattison T s view regarding
the relation of the self to the absolute can best be brought
out in his criticism of Bosanquet's view. Although Bosanquet
frequently speaks of the "cont ribution" made by the finite
self to ultimate reality, he seems constantly to imply that
this is to be conceived as the contribution of an "element”
11 IOG
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12 IOC, 267.
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or quality, some flavor or tang, to a universal experience
—
not as consisting in its own total living reality as a
specific incarnation, a center into which the Absolute has
poured, its own being. Bosanquet is quoted, as saying that
,T the finite self, like everything else in the universe, is
now and. here beyond, escape an element in the Absolute” to
which is the footnote: IT I do not say a member of the Abso-
lute. Such an expression might imply that it is, separately
and with relative independence, a standing differentiation
of the Absolute.”
The too exclusive monism of Bosanquet f s system, Pringle-
Pattison asserts, depends on a defective idea of what is
meant by a self or by the fact of individuation in general.
Pie thinks that Bosanquet T s theory does not contain the idea
of self at all: the world is dissolved into a collection of
qualities or adjectives which are ultimately housed in the
Absolute. Because of the failure to appreciate the meaning
of finite selfhood, Pringle-Patt ison believes that it is
difficult to say whether even the Absolute is to be regarded
as a self or not—that is to say, whether what is called the
absolute experience possesses the centrality or focalized
unity which is the essential characteristic of a self, and
in its degree, of everything that is real. 14
13 iOGr, 267. See also Bosanquet, VAD, 257
14 IOG, 271.
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Pringle-Patt ison maintains that the idea of Bosanquet,
namely, that the finite self "is adjectival on what is "beyond
itself” is untenable. The word adjectival, he goes on to
say, though intelligible is none the less metaphorical. He
says that things are not adjectives of one another. Tor ex-
ample, a shoe is not an attribute of a foot, and a son is not
an attribute of his father, though in both cases the one fact
transcends itself, and carries you to the other. Pringle-
Pattison states that if reduced to plain prose and ordinary
English usage, the "adjectival” theory of the finite is simply
the denial of unrelated reals, then he can accept it. If
no finite fact can either exist or be understood by itself,
Pringle-Patt ison holds that the true view of Beality must be
that which conceives the universe as an inclusive system of
interrelated facts which, as so included and interrelated,
are to be regarded as constituent members of a single whole .-*- 0
This fact is true and important from the side of the Absolute
as from the point of view of the finite beings themselves.
The differentiation or creation, according to Pringle-Patti-
son, constitutes the very essence and open secret of the
Absolute life. ° This expression is a contradiction of the
absolutistic view set forth by Bradley that the individual
existence of finite selves is illusion or mere appearance.
1 5 100, 275
1 6 100, 277
.’
S
-
e
f
,
-
.
_
,
'
.
67
Pringle-Pattison contends, 021 the other hand, that individual
existence of finite selves constitutes the very texture of
reality.
Pringle-Pattison believes that the idea of "contribution"
so prominent in the writings of Bosanquet, is true if rightly
understood. But what, asks Pringle-Pattison, of our contri-
bution to the Absolute just lay in being ourselves, our
particular, imperfect, but developing self, the unique in-
dividual whom it has taken such pains to fashion? He states
that the contribution cannot lie in any of the qualities of
the individual taken separately, for these are all universals,
and as such must be already fully represented in the perfect
experience of the Absolute. Because of this fact, Pringle-
Pattison objects to such terms, used by Bradley as "merged, 77
1 7
"blended,' 7 "fused," and "dissolved into a higher unity.
"
x
Pringle-Pattison contends that the whole conception of
blending and merging, as applied to finite individuals, de-
pends 021 the failure to recognize that every real individual
must possess a substantive existence in the Aristotelian
sense. He states that both Bradley and Bosanquet insist on
taking the individual as an adjective, thereby reducing it
to a conflux of universals or qualities. But Pringle -Patt i-
son states that it is a trite observation that no number of
17 106, 281
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abstract universale flocking together can give a concretely
existing individual. To exist means to he subject of quali-
ties, to have or possess a nature. This, he states, is
recognized in the corrent distinction between existence and
content, between the ,T that' T and the "what." By the "that" of
a thing, the substantive in it, is not meant a solid core of
being, a grain of reality-stuff, to which as a support, the
qualities are attached. It cannot be taken out and exhibited
as something over and the qualities.
Pringle- Patti son believes, however, that a reaction a-
gainst this conception leads to an exclusive stress on the
content or nature as constituting and differentiating the
individuals. Individuals, he argues, are ultimately differ-
entiated by their nature, that is to say, by their specific
content, including the peculiar arrangement or make-up of the
content—what is called its peculiar organization or system.
But Pringle -Pattis on thinks that this way of stating the
case is true only so long as it does not obscure the fact
that what is dealt with, in each case, is a concrete existent
There is, he states, a subtle danger in the term content
—
a suggestion that the individual is simply a very complex of
universals. But if, he goes on to say, the individual is
not to be regarded as put together out of the abstract
18 100, 28-3
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universal, in the shape of so many qualities, and the ab-
stract particular in the shape of a point of existence,
neither can it be regarded as simply an intricately mingled
group of universals—a highly complex adjective. So to think
of it is to confound the abstractions of knowledge with the
concrete texture of reality; it is entirely to overlook the
unity and centrality which is the characteristic of concrete
existence. This is what Pringle-Pattison means by indivi-
, . . 19duat ion.
Pringle-Pattison thinks that the way the self "separates
itself from the common foundation of all things," constitutes
a mystery. He points out that monistic writers are too apt
to obliterate or explain away the characteristic feature of
the relation. He maintains that if the individuals are
simply pipes through which the Absolute pours itself, jets,
as it were, of one fountain, there is no creation, no real
differential ion, and, therefore, in a sense, no mystery. A
self which is merely the channel or mouthpiece of another
is not a self. It is of the very nature of a self that it
thinks and acts and views the world from its own center:
each of us, he states, dichotomizes the universe in a dif-
ferent place. Thus no supposed result of speculative theory
can override a certainty based on direct expe rience--the
I 9 IOCt, 283
,-
-
-
.
.
f
, f , * »
2
, ,
—
70 .
certainty, namely, that it is we who act and we who think.
'7e are not simply an ideal point through which the forces or
idea of the universe cross and pass. This primary conviction
is not inspired by the ulterior motive of introducing pure
contingency and overthrowing the idea of law and system. TTo
doubt it excludes a fatalistic determinism a tergo
,
which
simply the denial of selfhood altogether; but, thinks Pringle-
Pattison it forces itself upon us apart from any outlook upon
consequences . It is, he thinks, a direct certainty, but that
it is based on an insight into the contradictory nature of
any counter-hypothesis.
Pringle-Patt ison contends that the relation of the Ab-
solute to finite individuals cannot be properly stated in
terms of the old metaphvsic of substance. He thinks that
the essential feature of the Christian conception of the world
in contrast to the Hellenic is, it may be said to be that it- re-
gards the person and the relations of persons to one another
as the essence of reality, whereas Creek thought conceived
of personality, however spiritual, as a restrictive character-
istic of the finite—a transitory product of a life which as
a whole is impersonal. Modern absolutism seem, he thinks,
to revert to the pre-Christian mode of conception, and to
repeat also the too exclusively intellectualistic attitude,
20
which characterizes Greek thought in the main." Pringle-
20 TOG, 292
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Pattison argues, that no solution of the problem of God and
man can he reached from a consideration of man as merely a
cognitive being. Bare will is an abstraction; but so is
knowledge, he states, if it is not regarded as the moving
and determining force in a personality, shaping its attitude
to the world and all the action which is the outcome of that
attitude. In this sense, it is held to be the character,
of spiritual will, that is the concrete personality. It is
21
as such a will that man is thought to be independent.
B. The Freedom of the Individual
Pringle-Patt ison holds that to be a self is to be a
formed will, originating its own actions and accepting ul-
timate responsibility for them. For in all questions of
moral causation the person is necessarily, for Pringle- °at-
tison, a terminus ad quern or a terminus a quo . The person
is held to be the source of the action for we cannot go be-
hind him and treat him as a thoroughfare through which certain
forces operate and contrive to produce a particular result.
The person is not to be thought of as a fixed and unchange-
able unit. Such a person is open to moral education and
spiritual regeneration: he may change so much, thinks
Pringle-Patt ison, as to become a new creature. But although
21 IOG
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he is thus open to all the influences of the universe, these
do not act on him like forces ah extra . They make their
appeal to him, hut he must give the response. He cannot he
driven; he must he drawn. Pringle -Pattison continues by
saying that the process of transformation is always, in a
real aspect of it, the person's own act, his deliberate
choice. Thus we may believe in the ultimately constraining
power of the Good, but realize that a moral being cannot he
commandeered; he must be persuaded, and the process may he
long. By this, Pringle-Patti son simply means that the self-
conscious being is free. This freedom is held to he the
fundamental condition of the ethical life; "without it we
22
should have a world of automata."
Pringle-Pattison believes that the creation of beings
who are really selves, with this measure of "apartness" and
independent action, is the "main miracle" of the universe.
He thinks that it is, in the very nature of the case, impos-
sible that we should understand the relation between a
creative Spirit and its creatures, whether as regards the
independence conferred or the mode in which the life-history
of the finite being still remains part of the infinite ex-
perience. Pinite beings know one another from the outside,
he maintains, the knower being ipso facto excluded from the
22 IOG
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immediate experience of any other center. But there can he
no such harrier, states Pringle-Patt ison, between the finite
consciousness and the Being in which its existence is rooted.
It must remain open and accessible— it must enter into the
divine experience in a way for which our mode of knowing
hardly furnishes us an analogy. It is, ^ringle-Pattison
believes, in the nature of the case, impossible that we should
understand, and be able to construct for ourselves, the
relation in question; ,T for to do so would be to transcend
the conditions of our individuality,” to get, as it were,
behind the conditions of finite existence and actually repeat
the process of creation and realize the absolute experience.
Thus Pringle-Pattison concludes that when we do try to
schematize the characteristics of selfhood by making the
individual a vehicle of transmission or on the other hand,
we lose hold of the creative unity altogether by treating the
23individuals as independent, self-existent units. He goes,
on to state that because such in the inevitable fate of any
attempt to describe the fact in terras devised to express the
relation of one finite fact to another, and only there ap-
propriate, it by no means follows that such creation is im-
possible for the Absolute. Ee holds that no theoretical
difficulties in conceiving how we can be free should prevent
25 IOG-, 293.
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us from recognizing that we are free. In asserting freedom
we are not asserting anything additional or extraneous about
our experience, Pringle-Pattison states. He contends that
we are simply describing its nature, as we know it from
within. Pringle-Pattison is applying in this supreme in-
stance, the principle which has poiided him throughout, the
04
principle of the reality of appearances.
0. The Self From the Side of the Absolute
So far as Pringle-Pattison is concerned, individuation,
in the sense explained, appears to represent the fundamental
method of creation, or, in other words, the fundamental
structure of the actual world. He thinks that this same
fact is emphasized "from the side of the Absolute." He thinks
that Bosanquet is correct in the following statement:
Je are finite, which means incomplete, and not
fitted to be absolute ends.
. . ,.7e must have
something greater than our finite selves to
contemplate. 7e want something above us, some-
thing to make us dare and do and hope to be. 2^
Or again, "The unit looks from itself and not to itself and
0/2
asks nothing better than to be lost in the whole. " co
Pringle-Pattison believes the statements by Bosanquet
are true for they bring out the familiar paradox of the
ethical and religious life, dying to live, self-realization
24 IOG-, 394.
25 Bosanquet, IAY, 255. Pringle -Patt ison, IOG, 294.
25 Bosanquet, VDI, 153. Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 294.
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through self-sacrifice, self-development through absorption
in objective interests and in the currents of the universal
life. He believes that the individual who would find his
end in the culture of his own personality, whether a moral
work of art or in the wider fields of literature and taste,
suffers the same defeat as the voluptuary who pursues pleasure
for pleasure’s sake. But Pringle -Pattison hold that al-
though the individual may not make himself his own End, the
world of finite individuals may well constitute the End of
the absolute. Pringle-Patt ison does not believe that we can
ascribe to the Absolute the self-centered life, the contem-
plation of His own glory, which spells moral death to the
creature. He thinks that the infinite reality reflects it-
self in the finite nature, and that, in the conditions of
mortal perfection, "our souls have sight of that immortal
sea which brought us hither"— repeating in the process of
? 7their own experience the flux and reflux of the cosmic life.
The idea of end or purpose may not be literally appli-
cable in such sphere, but Pringle-Patt ison thinks that we
may at least say that just "from the side of the Absolute"
the meaning of the finite process must lie in the creation
of a world of individual spirits; for to such alone can He
reveal himself, and from them receive the answering of love
27 IDS, 296
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and adoration. The coming into being of such inte rnalit ies
means "elicit ing' T out of the common fund of externality a
new world of appreciation, of mutual recognition and spiritual
communion, to which the former now assume a merely instru-
mental function, ,T a circuit made by the absolute towards the
formation of being capable of spiritual response, which en-
rich thereby the life from which they spring." He thinks
that only for and in such being does the Absolute take on the
character of God. He conceives this world of self-conscious
personalities to be the Givitas Dei
,
described by St. August-
ine and by Leibnitz or the kingdom of the Spirit of which
theologians speak as the great consummation. Pringle-Pattison
believes that the yearning of the divine for fellowship is
best brought out in the following line of Schiller with which
Hegel closes his Phenomenology :
Friendless was the mighty Lord of Worlds,
Felt defect — therefore created spirits.
Blessed mirrors of his blessedness --
From the chalice of the world of souls
Foams for him now infinitude.^
Pringle-Pattison states finally that if we project our
imagination thus into the vacancy before the world was, be-
fore God was truly God, we must remember that we are merely
translating into terms of time, as in a Platonic myth, the
eternal fact of the divine nature, as a self-communicating
28 iog, 296
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life. The divine Eremite, as a pre-existent Creator, is a
figure, he thinks, of the logical imagination: it indicates
pa
what God is not, it does not tell us what He once was.
This chapter has dealt with Pringle-Pattison T s view of
the relation of the self to the Absolute. He concludes that
the finite self is not an absolutely independent and subsis-
tent entity. Each self is free-originating its own actions
and assuming responsibility for them. The self is open to
the influences of the universe; it enters into relations
with other selves. Prom the point of view of the Absolute,
the existence or realization of finite selves give meaning
and purpose to the universe.
Two points may be mentioned concerning Pringle- Dattison T s
views on this phase of the subject. The first is that after
criticizing various other views, he finally concludes that
it is "impossible that we should understand, and be able to
30
construct for ourselves, the relation" between finite be-
ings and the Absolute.
The second point is that a slight change of emphasis is
noted. In Hegelianism and Personality
,
he speaks of the self
31
as being "impervious" to other selves.' In a later book,
the Idea of God
,
he expresses regret in the use of the. terra
29 iog, 296.
30 IOG, 293.
31 HP, 227.
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"impervious ." By it, he means that each self resists in-
55:
vasion; that it refuses to admit another self within itself.
In other words, it means that there can he no coincidence or
literal identification of several selves.
The only change of emphasis is that in Hegelianism and
?e rs onal i ty , Pringle-Patt ison feels that he overemphasized
the exclusiveness of the in his reaction against the Hegelian
view. He states: "The exclusiveness of the self, especially
in its relation to the divine, was, I have little doubt, too
5^5
strongly emphasized in my argument." But he adds that
"apart from crudity of expression this still seems to me
obvious and may be considered to underlie the argument in
34
several of the preceding lectures."
Therefore the self possesses freedom, is open to the
influences of the absolute, cannot be identified with any
other self but can enter into relations with other selves.
32 HP, 227.
33 HP, footnote, p. 389-90.
34 ibid.
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CHAPTER VII
COMPREHENSIVE DIGEST OP THE THESIS
In the light of the foregoing survey of Pringle -Patt i-
son's conception of personality, it is possible to set down
some of the conclusions which may be drawn from such a study
In the first place, the problem of personality occupies
a dominant place in the philosophical thought of Pringle-
Pattison. It was the central theme of his second series of
"Balfour Philosophical Lectures” which were published in
1887 under the title of Hegelianism and Personality . Becaus
certain statements in these lectures lent themselves to easy
misinterpretation, Pringle-Pattison devoted a good part of
his first Gifford lectures, The Idea of God in the Light of
Re c ent Philos o ohy
,
to correcting these misinterpretations.
Probably his best treatment of the problem of personality is
given in his second set of Gifford lectures on the Idea of
Immortality .
In the second place, it may be said that Pringle-Patti-
son built up his philosophical system, especially his view
on the nature of personality, through a critical analysis of
other views on the subject. Eor this reason, he treats the
subject largely from a historical point of view. Beginning
with the most primitive ideas of the nature of the soul, he
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traces the development of the conception down to modern times.
Through the empirical approach to the study of personality,
Pringle-Patt ison is forced to reject the traditional conceo-
tion of the soul.
In the third place, through his critical evaluation of
the traditional conception of the soul and the ahsolutistic
view of Hegel and his followers, certain definite aspect of
Pringle-Patt ison' s view is brought out. He believes that
the creation of finite spirits or selves is, in the words of
Heats, the "main miracle" of the universe. Selves are the
ends of the universe and everything else becomes the means
to these ends. The body, for example, is only a means or
instrument for the realization of selves through conscious
experience •
.tiS a fundamental rnonist, Pringle -Pat ti son emphasizes the
fact that just as life emerges through infinite degrees from
the inorganic to the organic, so consciousness emerges when
there is passage from merely animal life of semi-passive
perception and association to the distinctively human level
of the active conceptual reason. The fact of evolution is
held to be important in this connection, but Pringle -Pattison
seriously objects to the methods of those who insist on
explaining the higher order of being from the lower order of
being or the consequents by the antecedents.
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Another aspect of Pringle-Patt ison T s conception of the
self is that it is a unique conscious unity. This unity does
not consist of any kind of unchanging substantial unit, but
is rather a coherent selfhood shaped by its experiences.
The self is the systematic unity of the conscious experiences
of a particular individual center--the individual center
being the bodily organism. This fact of unity is directly
experienced
.
The self is conceived by Pringle-Patt ison as possessing
freedom of will and relative independence from other selves
and God, though the limitations of finite relationships are
somehow transcended by God. Freedom is fundamental to the
ethical life. However, Pringle-Patt ison does not believe
that it is possible to show how this freedom of the finite
self is compatible with the ontological connection between
the finite self and the Absolute. This, he thinks, we must
accept even though we cannot empirically verify it.
In conclusion, a word may be said of Pringle-Pattison T s
emphasis on the ethical and religious significance of per-
sonality. The self or mind which comes into existence
through the medium of the body, has the potentiality of such
infinite worth, that Pringle-Pattison believes that when the
body ceases, the true self will continue its immortal pil-
grimage under new and appropriate conditions. From another
point of view, Pringle-Pattison believes that the finite
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individual is of such importance in the world that they may
well constitute the End of the Absolute.
Such a conception as that of Pringle -Pattison leads one
to the conclusion that the nature of God and the meaning of
the existence of the universe must he determined from the ends
sought--the creation and realization of personality.
.
83 .
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